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J O H N FINNIS

ON REASON

AND AUTHORITY

IN LAW'S EMPIRE

Law's Empire will shape jurisprudence by its admirably resourceful
attention to understanding a community's law "internally". It promotes reflective understanding of the practical argumentation constitutive of the attitude(s) in which that law subsists. But the book neglects
some of practical understanding's resources of political and moral
theory, and overestimates practical reasoning's power to identify
options as the best and the right)

The book "takes up the internal, participants' point of view; it tries to
grasp the argumentative character of our legal practice by joining that
practice and struggling with the issues of soundness and truth participants face" (14).
O f course, this '[joining" is, at least for the most part, an "only
'virtual'" (422) participation; jurisprudence, as such, is only a
propaedeutic to, or reflection upon, choosing; it is not itself a choice
such as the participants themselves must make, to authorise or withhold, or to risk or accept, coercion - and take the consequences. But
1 All parenthetical and/or otherwise unattributed numbers are references to
pages of Law's Empire. I shall pass over many good things in the book: its
neo-classical identification (413) of the ontological basis of law in an attitude
(voluntas, habitus) rather than in propositions, processes or persons as such; its
identification, alongside its healthy individualism in ontology and epistemology, of the practical and moral reality of corporate responsibility ("personification") (167, 172, 296); its critique of two-level utilitarianism (290) and its
comments on "academic" and "practical" elaboration of moral/political
theory (285-87); its elaboration of community in terms of fraternity; its link
between the theory of law, the theory of evil law, and the force of good
law (110-11).
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Dworkin rightly insists that jurisprudential work, insofar as it bears on
the situation of some contemporary community, is genuinely continuous, indeed homogeneous, with the practical reasoning which
characteristically precedes actual legal choices (legislative, judicial, or
private) in that community: "no firm line divides jurisprudence from
adjudication or any other aspect of legal practice .... Jurisprudence is ... silent prologue to any decision at law" (90; see also 380).
The theory rather confusingly labelled "law as integrity", but proposed
as an alternative to the theories labelled conventionalism and pragmatism, "offers itself as continuous with - the initial part o f - the
more detailed interpretations it recommends" (226). And since the
opportunity (or lack of opportunity) to make a choice - to literally
join a practice and take the consequences - does not affect the
argumentative content of practical reasoning, the jurisprudential
method envisaged is equally available, in principle, to guide the study
of communities and laws foreign to us, or past.
Dworkin thus identifies argumentation (the argumentativeness of
legal practice: 14) as centrally constitutive of the social phenomenon
o f law. Taking m y cue from that, I have spoken here o f practical
reasoning. 2 But that is not a term which Dworkin promotes. Instead,
he prefers to speak of interpretation. N o w "interpretation" is usually
understood as, in a sense, passive or at least derivative, whereas practical reasoning, reasoning towards choice and action, is understood as
active and creative. And indeed, Dworkin sometimes finds in the passivity or derivativeness implicit in the terminology o f his master-concepts (amongst which interpretation has perhaps pride of place) a tacit
and, I think, illicit support for his court-focussed concept of law. Consider, for example, his brief obiter dictum about legislation: it is "the
practice of recognizing as law the explicit decisions of special
bodies widely assumed to have that power [scil. of legislating]" (99,
emphasis added). Shuffled out of view is the law-creating role and
2 Of course, Dworkin often speaks, as we have seen, of law as a practice.But
it is clear that he uses the term "practice" to include any way of thinking or
arguing, any "methods [a social scientist's] subjects use in forming their own
opinions..." (64).
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practice o f legislatures; their responsibilities to engage in practical
reasoning with an eye to the c o m m o n good and the R u l e o f Law as
Fuller outlined it thus never come into focus.
But I am running ahead, and pointing to a weakness when, for the
present, I want to dwell upon the illuminating strength o f certain o f
the book's guiding conceptions. Notable amongst these is certainly its
author's willingness to e n d o w his term or concept, interpretation, with
much o f the richness o f practical reasoning's creative engagement
with goods (including o f course their privation: harms) and ends or
purposes. O f the three terms I have just italicised, Dworkin really
promotes only the term "purpose"; but above all he emphasises, massively, their functional equivalent: the role of point in interpretation.
The interpretative 3 attitude towards a practice assumes, he says, that
the practice "has value, that it serves some interest or purpose or
enforces some principle - in short that it has some point" (47). Indeed,
in the case o f some practices (such as the law) but not others (such as
tennis), the interpretative attitude makes another assumption: that the
requirements o f the practice are "sensitive to its point", i.e., are to be
"understood or applied or extended or modified ... by that point" (47).
But at this juncture (which, as he says, is foundational for the whole
book: 50), Dworkin shifts gear. The point or, synonymously here, the
meaning o f the social practice in question (courtesy, or law) is he says,
to be "imposed" (47).
Interpretation of... social practices ... is indeed essentially concerned with
purpose not cause. But the purposes in play are not (fundamentally) those of
some author but of the interpreter. Roughly, constructive interpretation is a
matter of imposing purpose on an object or practice in order to make of it
the best possible example of the form or genre to which it is taken to
belong (52).
This last assertion leaves much unclear. Is the interpreter supposed to
3 Using a "relaxed" and therefore (358) "liberal" conception of the requirements of fit, I shall take as normative the usage established by the repeated
use of "interpretative" on p. 107, and, seeking to put the book in "the best
light" by a constructive interpretation, shall treat the appearance elsewhere
of"interpretive" as a mere lapsuscalami, a "mistake".
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have some other purpose than the formal purpose o f making the
object as good an instance o f a genre as it can be.~ If genres provide
the basis or framework o f this formal purpose o f interpretation,
whose and what purposes inform and make the genre what it is.~
Dworkin does not stay to consider these issues. Indeed, what carries
him towards his rather puzzling affirmation o f the constructiveness o f
interpretation seems partly to be an equivocation on the word "creative". Interpretation o f art and social practice is to be called "creative"
because it aims "to interpret something created by people as an entity
distinct from them, rather than what people say, as in conversational
interpretation, or events not created by people, as in scientific interpretation" (50). The syntax o f our language makes this use o f
"creative" hazardously equivocal b e t w e e n the thus announced meaning ("pertaining to the created") and the meaning ("creative of...")
which is suggested by the metaphors o f "imposing" and "constructing" meaning and purpose. 4
The difficulties here are by no means all o f Dworkin's own
making. We can, as I have suggested elsewhere, usefully bear in mind
four orders o f intelligibility: the order (of nature) which is in no way
established by human understanding; the order (studied by logic,
methodology and epistemology) which one can bring into one's own
understanding; the order which one can bring into objects (boats,
phonemes, poems, constitutions) by making them according to an
intelligible plan or purpose; and the order which one can bring into
one's dispositions, choices and actions. By calling the interpretation
which bears on law "creative", Dworkin seems to place it in the third
order (of making, poeisis, factio) rather than the fourth (doing, praxis,
actio). Aristotle, Aquinas and the classic Western tradition down to
Bentham's uncomprehending attack upon it chose to envisage law
4 Dworkin is clear that the official meaning of "creative" in his use of
"creative interpretation" is simply % f a created object", and that, accordingly,
"interpretation is by nature the report of a purpose; it proposes a way of"
seeing what is interpreted ... as if" this were the product of a decision to
pursue one set of themes or visions or purposes, one 'point', rather than another" (58-59).
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(like the other main aspects of political reality) in the fourth order:
law has its principal intelligibility as a guide to choice, proposed to a
community of choosers by the choice of that community's lawmakers. 5 Still, one of law's usually characteristic features is that it has
part of its reality as symbols or formulations, which are created
objects in the third order, brought into being by legislation (including
judicial fiat) and thereafter imbued with a reality independent of the
intentions and choices of their maker(s) - a reality which thus creates a
problem for interpretation distinct from the problem of interpreting
those intentions and choices as acts. Moreover, we cannot say that when
Dworkin calls legal interpretation "creative" he thereby locates it in
the third order as opposed to the fourth, for he does
not seem to have any such distinction in mind. But we can say that it
would have been helpful if he had. For there is something distracting
about his appeal to the interpretation of artistic creations as the paradigm of the activity (let us allow, for the present, that it is interpretative) involved in the practice of law and legal argumentation, a practice whicfl at bottom seeks to bring order into human choices and
actions, present and future.
O f course, law in its central instantiations seeks to regulate present
decisions and future conduct (acta, agibilia, agenda) primarily by
attending to entities (rules, orders, precedents...) already existing
because somehow brought into being in the past OCacta). Dworkin
acknowledges this explicitly by embracing "the assumption that the
most general point of law, if it has one at all, is to establish a justifying
connection between past political decisions and present coercion"
(98). 6 But the acknowledgement leaves something to be desired,
because this statement of "the most general point of law" revives or
continues the puzzle about whose purposes or point are the primary or
fundamental subject-matter of jurisprudential reflection upon law.
Here, particularly, who is supposed to be doing the "establish5 See, e.g., Aquinas, in Eth. 1, 1; Summa Theol. I-II, q. 90 aa. 1-4. On the four
orders, see Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, pp. 136-39, 157.
6 "The heart of any positive conception of law.., is its answer to the question why past politics is decisive of present rights" (117).
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ing".~ The judge or jurist, n o w deliberating about the coercion which
might n o w be ordered and, if so, justified by relation to the past decisions.~ Or the past decision-makers, who made their decision(s) with a
view to establishing a justification - subsisting until terminated by
preordained expiry or a new decision - f o r future (including now
present) coercion (and, as Hart would wish to remind us, other
present and future social law-regarding conduct).~
If, as the paradigm of interpretation suggests, the establishing o f the
justifying connection with the past is the work (and purpose) of the
judge or jurist, still it is clone as a m o m e n t in a process of justifying
present choice and future conduct. It is done, in other words, in the
course o f a process of practical reasoning - indeed, reasoning towards
choice and action, praxis - in which the justifying relevance of the past
decisions (enactments, precedents, customs, etc.) must compete with
countervailing considerations o f expedience and principle. In that
respect, this judicial or juridical process of reasoning or argumentation
resembles - and has pro tanto the same point as - the reasoning which
must precede any justified act of legislative decision-making.
And if we take the other alternative, and suppose that the justifying
connection is established primarily in the legislative decision and act,
the point o f legislating is, even more. obviously, in need o f further
identification. Classically, that point was identified as promoting the
c o m m o n g o o d of the community for which the legislature is responsible. But that must b e elaborated so a~s to articulate a more specific
point, going to the legal form in which authority is thus exercised.
This more specific point is summarised by the phrase "The Rule of
Law", a multiform point analysed by Fuller, Raz; and others in terms
o f the desiderata o f formally or structurally good law-making. But this
is scarcely attended to by Dworkin. 7
In short, interpretation according to Dworkin is to be understood
on the model o f purpose, practical reasoning, and intention. This
understanding lends power and illumination to his account of the
interpretative attitude and its role in and in relation to law. But there
7 "General theories of law, for us, are general interpretations of our own
judicial practice" (410). Why be so narrow.~
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is an irreducible passivity or derivativeness about the concept o f interpretation, even after it has been transmuted by Dworkin from "of
created reality" to "a creating and imposing o f the interpreter's
purpose" (and after "construction" has likewise slid from "construing"
t o "creation"). 8 Interpretation resists being taken f o r the whole of
practical reasoning; or, perhaps more clearly, practical reasoning - e.g.,
political praxis - resists being rendered as "interpretation o f a practice".
Adjudication and juristic interpretation resist being taken for the constitutive and legislative moments in the life o f the law; those
moments resist being understood, through and through, as
interpretative. These resistances show up as missing or underdeveloped elements in the book's depiction o f law's empire - an
empire which is thus treated as if it were acquired in the w a y the
British (some say) once acquired theirs: in a fit of absence o f m i n d .
In short: even if Dworkin succeeded in showing that his account o f
interpretation and the interpretative attitude in legal practice is the
best account, he would not thereby have shown (nor does he otherwise s h o w ) t h a t law and legal practice and its point are adequately
described and explained by that account.
II.
There is more to be said about the book's epistemology before I turn
to a more orderly treatment o f its political and jurisprudential theory.
The "internality" o f fruitful jurisprudence has a dimension or implication which goes beyond simply the resolve to understand legal
phenomena as they are understood by those whose understanding and
intending o f them make them what they are. This further dimension
or implication is in play in the book's discussion o f "internal" and
"external" scepticism (76-86). This discussion restates points made,
8 Of course, the transmutation or slide does not go the whole way, but
remains in the tension established by the requirements of "fit" and "soundness", the former tending to hold the interpreter to the pre-interpretative
reality established by other people's purposes, practical reasoning and intention(s).
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perhaps more crisply and tellingly, in several recent articles by
Dworkin. The correctness or otherwise of a legal answer to a legal
question, or of a moral answer to a moral question, can be determined only by one who enters into the legal, or moral, arguments
and uses legal, or moral, criteria to judge one answer better than
another. From within the practices of legal and moral argument, the
disagreements noted by the external sceptic: are simply irrelevant
no argument at all. Arguments against the objectivity or truth of a
particular legal or moral claim are worthless unless they are legal or,
moral arguments. The external sceptic's denials that such claims can
or do correspond to "transcendental reality" or "the fabric of the
universe trade on unexplained, indeed "incomprehensible metaphors, and are empty and futile.
Law's Empire concludes that "the only skepticism worth anything is
skepticism of the internal kind" (86; see also 82). Internal scepticism
accepts that some social practices (or other objects of interpretation)
are better than others but denies that a particular object of interpretation has any of the worth attributed to it by its participants and those
who share their interpretative attitude. But this conclusion is stated
without the ~clat of chapter 7 of A Matter of Principle. Indeed, Law's
Empire's official position (80, 266) is that neither the general significance nor the rightness of external scepticism need be consider'ed in
the book or, it seems, in any other jurisprudential (or political or
moral) reflections.
The truth that even widespread disagreement is no argument
against a moral or legal assertion has an equally important counterpart:
the fact of one's agreement with an assertion is no ground for
agreeing. In the logic of argumentation, only the content of my
knowledge or beliefs is relevant, not the fact that I possess them.
Albeit in a rather specialised context (331-32), Dworkin very clearly
adverts to this "transparency" of "I believe that p" for "It is true that
-

"

"

"9

9 A Matter of Principle, 172. See, for the arguments paraphrased in this paragraph, ibid., pp. 137-42, 171-77; Cohen (ed.), Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence (1984), 277-80; Taking Rights Seriously (1978), pp.
123-24.
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p" and "p". He also states the implication of this transparency, viz., that
in making any affirmation, reaching any conclusion, answering any
question, one is "relying at the deepest level on what [one
oneself] believes" (314). Dworkin's writings taken together make it
clear that he rejects any subjectivist reading of this; in relying (say, for
the premisses of an argument) on what one believes, one relies on it
under the description what is [or: seems to be] the case, not under the
description what I believe about what is the case.
But I doubt whether Dworkin has focussed sufficiently on the
implications of these positions. In my Maccabaean Lecture, 1° I noted
that his arguments against enforcement of "majority preferences" fail
to observe the transparency of many beliefs held and acted upon, by
majorities, but not because they are so held. Law's Empire does not take
up those arguments, so I need not restate that point. But it is worth
noting here how often the book speaks in a way which, by syntactically overlooking transparency, gives needless (and, I believe, unintended) comfort to a subjectivist reading of the book and a subjectivist understanding of ethical, political and legal theory. Consider
the italicised redundancies in the following key statements:
(i)

"the exercise in hand is...: discovering which view of the
sovereign matters we discuss sorts best with the convictions we
each, together or severally, have and retain about the best account of
our common practices" (86).

(ii)

'[Justice is a matter of the correct or best theory of moral and
political rights, and anyone's conception o f justice is his
theory, imposed by his own personal convictions, of what these
rights actually are" (97).

(iii) "Hercules is not trying to reach what he believes is the best
substantive result, but to find the best justification he can of a
past legislative event" (338).

10 'A Bill of Rights for Britain? The Moral of Contemporary Jurisprudence',
Proc. Brit. Acad. 71 (1985) at 309-11.
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Or again: Perhaps Dworkin needed to say that the good judge decides
a hard case "by employing his own moral convictions" (120), for he
needed to make clear that the criteria o f soundness ultimately used by
the judge a r e o f soundness as assessed by him, and not, in the last
analysis, as assessed by (other members of) society. But he would have
done well to add,' immediately, that the judge does not employ his
moral convictions as his but as sound criteria, principles, rules or other
factors relevant as premisses in an argument. 11
Finally, Dworkin seems to give relativists - legion amongst law
students - needless (and again, I think, unintended) comfort by
extending his denials much wider than was called for by the metaphorical metaphysics of the external Sceptic. For Dworkin says that
"the practices of interpretation and morality give these claims [about
Hamlet and about the wrongness o f slavery] all the meaning they need
or could have" (83, emphases added); and "the 'objective' beliefs most
o f us have [about such matters] are moral, not metaphysical, beliefs"
(82). True, those practices and beliefs do not include the external
sceptics' bugaboos, "transcendental reality", "the fabric o f the
universe", the "out there", etc. But they do, commonly, include or
presuppose conceptions of what counts as human flourishing, and
these conceptions not only presuppose some beliefs about the nature
of things (e.g., freedom o f choice, continuity of personal identity), 12
but also contribute to (the rational justification of) other beliefs about
the nature o f that (human) type of being whose flourishing could
involve the opportunities and responsibilities which moral judgments
assert it does. The truth that practical knowledge cannot be deduced
from theoretical does not entail that there is no ontology of morals,
or that ethics has nothing to learn from and nothing to Contribute to
the metaphysical understanding o f our nature and our world.
1, Similarly, it is a pity Dworkin uses "conviction", rather than "consideration", "factor", "argument", or "principle", is passages such as: "The constraint
fit imposes on substance ... is therefore the constraint of'one type of political
conviction on another in the overall judgment [bye] which interpretation
makes a political record the best it can be overall" (257, emphasis added).
12 As Dworkin himself says, one's view about the point of law must rest on
"large questions of'personality, life, and community" (101).
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Epistemological or methodological issues closer to the central concerns o f jurisprudence are raised by Dworkin's account o f the "semantic sting" and his rendering o f legal positivism, legal Realism, and
natural law theory into "semantic theories o f law". Here the book
seems to me confused and seriously misleading.
The "semantic sting" is Dworkin's name for "the argument that
unless lawyers and judges share factual criteria about the grounds o f
law there can be no significant thought or debate about what the law
is" (44). "Semantic theories suppose that lawyers and judges use mainly
the same criteria ... in deciding when propositions o f law are true or
false..." (33).
One notices at once the lack o f quantification o f "share factual
criteria": share some, share many, share all? The second passage says:
"mainly". But if this belief is fallacious - a poisonous sting to be drawn
- it seems indistinguishable from Dworkin's ow'n belief that "the lawyers o f any culture where the interpretive attitude succeeds must
largely agree at any one time" - agree, that is, "about what practices
are legal practices", and about "legal paradigms, proposition[s] o f law
like the traffic code that we take to be true if any are" (91). W h e n
stating his view that such "pre-interpretive, agreement is a necessary
precondition o f any flourishing interpretative, critical or juristic enterprise, Dworkin claims that his view differs from the semantic sting in
not supposing "that we identify these institutions [and paradigms]
through some shared and intellectually satisfying definition o f
what a legal system necessarily is and what institutions necessarily
make it up" (91).
But the latter supposition seems quite distinct from the suppositions earlier said to constitute the semantic sting and the semanticism
o f semantic theories o f law - suppositions which, as we saw, made no
assertions about "what a legal system necessarily is", but were identified by Dworkin as claiming that the criteria o f "the law" which are
used by judges and lawyers - presumably, o f a given, particular legal
system - are "mainly shared". At this point I am not considering
whether anyone has ever held any o f the semantic theories, or been
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the victim o f the semantic sting. I am concerned only with Dworkin's
failure, both when defining vicious semanticism, and when speaking
in his own voice, to distinguish between "the law" (of a
particular community, the topic o f thought by that community's lawyers and judges) and "law" (a topic o f thought o f anthropologists,
sociologists, other historians, moralists and jurisprudents such as Hart,
Kelsen and Dworkin). Dworkin treats "the law" and "law" as
synonymous,~3 and I fail to see how he can be so indifferent to the
manifest difference between the two terms, corresponding to the difference between the two sorts o f intellectual enterprise which I have
just indicated.
Positivist and natural law theories in jurisprudence are not, and do
not even look like, theories about the law o f any particular community (in the sense o f offering to identify propositions o f law which are
true for that legal system), or about the criteria for identifying the law
which are used by the lawyers and judges o f any particular community. They look like theories about what law - a(ny) legal system "necessarily is" (at least in its paradigmatic instantiations, its central

cases).
Moreover, such theories are not, and do not even look, "semantic",
whether in the sense stipulated by Dworkin or in any other. Austin's
"main idea", Dworkin says, was "that law is a matter o f historical decisions b y people in positions o f political power" (36). Hart's, he says, is
"that the truth o f propositions o f law is in some important way
dependent upon conventional patterns o f recognizing law" (35).
Neither "main idea" is semantic. 14
13 E.g., in describing semanticism, he moves - without comment, and in
consecutive sentences - from (the assumption that) "we all use the same
criteria in framing ... statements about what the law is" to (the assumption
that) "we do share some set of standards about how 'law' is used" (32).
14 The account of Hart is quite inaccurate, too. Dworkin asserts that,
according to Hart, the rule of recognition, in whose acceptance lie "the true
grounds of law", "assigns to particular people or groups the authority to
make law" (34). Consequently, anyone who obeyed Hitler's commands
simply out of fear, and who thus did not accept a rule of recognition
entitling Hitler to make law, would be committed, according to Dworkin's
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Similarly, Dworkin's semantic rendering o f natural law theory
produces a thesis which natural law theorists have not treated as
integral to their theories: "that lawyers follow criteria that are not
entirely factual, but at least to some extent moral, for deciding which
propositions o f law are true" (35).
The truth is that neither positivism nor natural law theory is any
m o r e concerned about " h o w all lawyers use the w o r d 'law'" (36) than
Dworkin is) 5 The book's concern about the semantic sting and
semantic theories o f law seems to me a muddle and a distraction, save
in one respect: the discussion o f the pseudo-question whether
immoral legal systems really count as law. It is the case that some legal
philosophers, e.g., Hart, have thought that jurisprudence must make,
"once and for all", a choice between a "wide" sense o f " l a w " (such that
the Nazis had law) and a "narrow" (such that they did not). Dworkin's
discussion brings out well the context- and audience-relativity o f
statements such as "the Nazis had law" (103-04). 16 Contemporary
, Hart, to say that "no propositions of law were true" in Nazi Germany (35).
~This overlooks that Hartian rules of recognition are usually multiple, and
contain rules which are in no way derived from (even when
they are subject to) the supreme rule of change which identifies the people
or group with supreme authority to make laws.
15 As Dworkin quietly concedes in the notes tO another chapter, Hart's
theory was not controlled by semantic considerations, but by judgments
about "what would cure defects in the organization of political coercion that
would be inevitable without [special legal] conventions [broadly accepted
throughout the community]" (429), and by a view of which concept of law
would "facilitate moral reflection" (430). Dworkin's discussion of Raz's
positivism is inaccurate. He claims that it "explicitly denies any reliance on
political convictions of any sort", and that it "fall[s] back on linguistic rules,
to say that this is just what 'law' or 'authoritative' means under any criteria
for its application educated lawyers and laymen all accept" (429-30).i In the
article cited, viz, 'Authority, Law and Morality', The Monist 68 (1985):
295-324, Raz in fact denies that he assumes any such conscious
unanimity (p. 304) or conceptual clarity (p. 321), and founds his argument on
claims about what practices are "servic[e]able" and beneficial (p. 304) and
(evaluatively) "important" (p. 320).
16 See also Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Ra'ghts, pp. 234-37, 365-66;
contrast Hart, The Concept of Law, pp. 203, 206-07; Essayson Bentham, p. 146.

John Finn8

370

jurisprudence, in some o f its arguments and positions; has indeed suffered somewhat from what I h a v e called "conceptual dogmatism",
and Dworkin's protest against that is well taken, iv But he errs in
claiming that the framework self-interpretation o f recent jurisprudence is, has been, or can be usefully represented as concerned
with or founded upon linguistic agreement, or being in any other
w a y "semantic". 18
IV.
It is time to attend,to Dworkin's theory o f law. But there is a bridge
b e t w e e n his theory o£interpretation and one o f the main features o f
his theory o f law "as integrity". The bridge: those pervasive D w o r kinian categories, "the best" and "the right".
The task o f interpretation, r e m e m b e r , is to make its object the best
it can be (within its genre), to show it "in the best light possible"
(243). The goal o f law as integrity, i.e., o f the interpretative attitude
constitutive o f the practice we call law, is to find in every situation o f
civil dispute the right answer which the given civil society's law makes
available "in most hard cases" (viii), and which is identified by the best
interpretation or theory o f that legal system. So: "Judges w h o accept
the interpretive ideal o f integrity decide hard cases b y trying t o find,
17 There has been a good deal of loose thinking, or talk, about "conceptual
analysis", explaining "the concept of law", and the like. See, e.g., Natural Law
and Natural Rights, pp. 278-79. But the malady is not well diagnosed in terms
of "semantic theories", afortiori when "semantic" is itself used imprecisely (in
the ways mentioned above, and so as to extend even to proposals about how
words should be used: e.g., Law's Empire, 135).
18 So Dworkin in the end misstates his legitimate point. He says that it is a
mistake to ask whether wicked legal systems are law, because the question
assumes that its answer turns on whether the linguistic rules we share for
applying "law" include or exclude such systems - whereas in fact "we do not
share any rules of the kind it assumes" (108): It would have been more
accurate to say that while we do share linguistic rules which bear on the
question, we can and do use or adapt or discard those rules, intelligibly,
when certain contexts make our understanding and our communicative
intentions sufficiently clear.
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in some coherent set o f principles about people's rights and duties, the
best constructive interpretation o f the political structure and legal
doctrine o f their community!' (255; also 262). Law, or "law's attitude",
"aims, in the interpretive spirit, to lay principle over practice to show
the best route to a better future, keeping the right faith with the past"
(413). "We accept integrity as a distinct political ideal, and
we accept the adjudicative principle o f integrity as sovereign over
law, because we want to treat ourselves as an association o f principle,
as a community governed by a single and coherent vision o f justice
and fairness and procedural due process in the right relation" (404; also
219, 398). 19
N o w it is true that injustice is done only when wrong choice is
made in distributions o f goods or in other dealings between persons.
So, when no wrong is done in such dealings, a right answer has been
found to a practical problem. But that in no way entails that justice
has anything to do with searching for "the right" distribution, or "the
right" answer.
Dworkin's efforts to show that a uniquely correct ("the right")
answer is normally available in a hard case provide an impressive
dialectical argument for the contrary and classical view that while
there are many ways o f going and doing wrong, there are also in
most situations o f personal and social life a variety o f incompatible
right options - that we should seek good answers, and eschew bad
ones, but not dream o f best ones. Indeed, Dworkin's account o f the
relations between "fit" and "soundness" in interpretation helps make
clear why, in any realistic context, no uniquely correct answer could
be available in any case where there is identifiable a set o f
two or more options/answers which do not violate any rule binding
on the judge or other chooser or interpreter.
19 And justice "is a matter of the right outcome of the political system: the
right distribution of goods, opportunities and resources" (404), while fairness
"is a matter of finding political procedures ... that distribute political power
in the right way" (164; also 404), and procedural due process "is a matter of
the right procedures ... that promise the right level of accuracy..." (165; also
405).
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It is important to note that m y denial that uniquely correct, or best,
answers are available to practical questions has nothing to do with
scepticism, internal or external. N o r has it anything to do with the
popular argument which Dworkin, as we have seen, is rightly concerned to scorn and demolish, viz., that disagreement is endemic. (The
existence o f disagreement is a mere fact about people, irrelevant to
the merits o f any practical or other interpretative claim.) As Dworkin
says, "the wise-sounding judgement that no one interpretation could
be best must be earned and defended like any other interpretive
claim" (237-38). 20 Dworkin himself provides the labour and materials
for such a defence.
N o r does my denial rest on the observation that none o f us has the
"superhuman" powers o f Dworkin's Hercules. Hercules himself, no
matter h o w superhuman, could not justifiably claim unique correctness for his answer to a hard case (as lawyers in sophisticated legal systems use that term). For in such a case, a claim to have found the right
answer is senseless, in much the same way as it is senseless to claim to
have identified the English novel which meets the two criteria
"shortest and most romantic" (or "funniest and best", or "most English
and most profound"). 21 T w o incommensurable criteria o f judgment
are proposed - in Dworkin's theory, "fit" (with past political decisions)
and '[justifiability" (inherent substantive moral soundness). A hard case
is hard (not merely novel) when not only is there more than one
answer which violates no applicable rule, but the answers thus available are ranked in different orders along each o f the available criteria

20 In the context, however, Dworkin seems to treat "no interpretation
could be best" as equivalent to: no interpretation is worthwhile because
none can be identified as bad. I endorse the sentence quoted only in its literal
meaning.
21 O f course, it is conceivable that a novel might happen to be both the
most romantic and the funniest. In any realistically rich field, such as the
English novel, this cannot be expected and the injunction to look for such a
novel is practically senseless.

On Reason and Authority in Law's Empire

373

o f evaluation: brevity, humour, Englishness, fit (integrity), 22 romance,
. . . .
,, 23 and so forth.
inherent ,,q u a h"t y ,,, profundity, inherent 3usufiabillty,
In earlier works, Dworkin tried to head o f f the problem o f incommensurability o f criteria by proposing a kind o f lexical ordering: candidates (theories o f law) must fit adequately, and o f those which satisfy
this "threshold" criterion, that which ranks highest in soundness is "the
best" even though it fits less well than (an)other(s). 24 This solution was
empty, for he identified no criteria, h o w e v e r sketchy or "in principle", for specifying w h e n fit is "adequate", i.e., for locating the threshold o f fit beyond which the criterion o f soundness would prevail.
Presumably, candidates for "the right answer" to the question " W h e n
•

-

22 Cf.: "questions of fit surface again, because an interpretation is pro tanto
more satisfactory if it shows less damage to integrity than its rival" (246-47).
Is it not surprising to find "integrity" denoting both the overall virtue of the
whole interpretative/legal enterprise and one of the "dimensions" of that
enterprise.~ Dworkin's reply seems to say that because commitment to
integrity makes no sense without commitment to fairness and justice, every
legal effort to be fair and just "flows from [an] initial commitment to
integrity" (263). Non sequitur.
23 Is it not fishy to find ~ustifiability", an inherently framework concept,
denoting one of the dimensions or criteria, when the other criterion, "fit", it
itself inherently evaluative, i.e., justificatory.~ "Best and shortest" is similarly
dubious, insofar as brevity is commonly accounted a virtue in novels. O f
course, even when brevity is treated as a mere neutral fact, the quest for the
best and shortest will still be chimerical in any realistically rich and complex
field of candidates.
24 See Taking Rights Seriously, pp. 340-41 (where Dworkin expressly
envisages the only really interesting and genuine form of hard case or contest between theories or interpretations of the law as a case where the rank
order in terms of fit of alternatives which all fit "adequately" is different
from the rank order in terms of soundness), 342, 360, also 122; Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence (1984), p. 272. In the third of these passages, Dworkin refers also, as if it were equivalent, to the account given in
'Is There Really No Right Answer in Hard Cases.~' New York L. Rev. 53
(1978), now A Matter of Principle (1985) at 143; but there the story is that
political/moral soundness comes into play if, and, it seems, only if, "two
justifications [scil. theories of law, interpretations, answers] provide
an equally good fit with the legal materials" (emphasis added).
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is fit adequate.~" would themselves be ranked in terms both of fit and
of soundness. An infinite regress, o f the vicious sort which nullify
purported explanations, was well under way.
In Law's Empire, Dworkin abandons the simple picture o f a lexical
ordering between the dimensions of fit and soundness. He stresses that
within the second dimension "questions of fit surface again, because
an interpretation is pro tanto more satisfactory if it shows less damage
to integrity than its rival" (246-47); "even when an interpretation su>vives the threshold requirement, any infelicities o f fit will count
against it ... in the general balance of political virtues" (256; see also
257). This is a gain in moral realism. But it strips away the last veil
hiding the problem of the incommensurability of the criteria
proposed for identifying a best or uniquely right interpretation,
theory or answer. We are left with the metaphor: "balance" - as in
"the general balance of political virtues" embodied in competing
interpretations. But in the absence o f any metric which could commensurate t h e different criteria (the dimensions of fit and
inherent moral merit), the instruction to "balance" (or, earlier, to
"weigh") can legitimately mean no more than bear in mind, conscientiously, all the relevant factors, and choose.
It is a feature of the phenomenology of choice that after one has
chosen, the factors favouring the chosen alternative will usually seem
to outweigh or overbalance those favouring the rejected
ahernative(s).2 s The chosen alternative will seem to have a supremacy,
a unique rightnessl But the truth is that the choice was not guided by
"the right answer", but rather establishedit in the sentiments, the dispositions, of the chooser. W h e n the choice is that o f the majority in the
highest relevant appeal court (a mere brute fact), the unique rightness
of the answer is established not only for the attitude o f those who
have chosen it, but also for the legal system or community for which
it has thus been authoritatively chosen and laid down as Or in a rule.
In the real world, of course, the problem of commensurability is
much more intense than I have portrayed it; for there is not just one
2s See Germain Grisez, "Against Consequentialism", Am.J.Jurisp. 23 (1978):
21-72 at 46-47.
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dimension o f soundness or substantive political justifiability, but many
incommensurable dimensions. Their incommensurability is profoundly important for ethics and political, not merely for legal, adjudication.
It has not been sufficiently noted, in debate on Dworkin's work, how
thoroughly he shares utilitarianism's deepest and most flawed assumption: the assumption o f the commensurability o f basic goods and thus
o f the states o f affairs which instantiate them. And this assumption is
not marginal to his theory o f law, as his denial o f absolute rights, 26
though important, can perhaps be said to be marginal; it is o f its
essence.
In sum: there are countless ways o f going wrong in a hard case; the
judgment that Mrs. McLoughlin and her legal advisers should be
summarily executed and their property distributed to the defendant
can head a list o f possible but erroneous judgments which has no end.
A case is hard, in the sense which interests lawyers, when there is
more than one right, i.e., not wrong, answer. Dworkin's discussion o f
the two dimensions has made this clearer than ever.
The objection I have made in this section is not, I think, confronted in the book. Instead, Dworkin imagines and responds to some
related objections which are easy to handle because exaggerated and
ill-focussed. "There can be no best interpretation when more than
one survives [the] test [of fit]"; therefore Hercules' claim to be
enforcing the law is fraudulent, or grammatically wrong, or confusing
(261,262). Dworkin's reply? First, Hercules' claim could be grammatically wrong only if the semantic sting were truth rather than error.
That we should accept. Second, Hercules' claim would be fraudulent
only if he did not share Dworkin's view that the judgments made by
each judge in a hard case are intended to state what the law is, not
• merely what it should now become. That, too, we should accept;
deception is not an issue in jurisprudence.
26 Taking Rights Seriously, p. 354. On incommensurability, see Raz, The
Morality of Freedom (1986), ch.13; Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, pp.
112-18 (and see pp. 223-26 on absolute rights); Fundamentals of Ethics, pp,
86-93; Finnis, Grisez and Boyle, Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism
(1987), pp. 241-54, 267-70, 286-87 (and see pp. 286-87 on moral absolutes).
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But to the charge that Hercules' claim is confusing, Dworkin
makes no reply. And the claim /s confusing (and confused), precisely
because (for the reasons I have been setting out, and not for the bad,
sceptical, or external reasons which Dworkin envisages as objections),
in a hard case, in legal systems like ours, there will be no one answer
which, because uniquely right, should be described as "the law governing the case". Moreover (though the descriptive sociology o f all this is
a secondary issue), Hercules' claim obscures the reality that conscientious judges do acknowledge that they are making new law, breaking
new ground - interstitially, no doubt, and usually by a "development"
which respects and makes use o f existing legal concepts and normative resources with an exclusiveness foreign to the legislature's
ventures in law-making - but for all that, by choice, a new
commitment, not mere discovery and application. To describe a conscientious judgment in a hard case as legal rather than moral is not
wrong, for such a judgment will be both constrained and shaped by
existing law in a way quite unlike any other moral judgment. 27 But to
deny the difference between application and development, easy cases
and hard cases in the sense I have specified, is indeed misleading.
Dworkin is right to insist that the answers to easy cases, too, presuppose conceptions o f fairness and justice (354), and in that sense he is
right to consider easy cases "only special cases o f hard ones" (266). But
he has no valid argument against the commonsense o f lawyers and
others who think that in some cases there is only one answer which is
not wrong, while in other (not infrequent) cases there is more than
one such answer, and reason itself (whether legal or even moral) lacks
the resources to identify one as best.
V.
A primary and perennial source o f the need for authority (including
what Dworkin calls "convention") is the rich variety o f eligible - i.e.,

27 But, unlike Raz and Dworkin, I don't care whether these judgments are
called judgments of law or not: see Natural Law and Natural Rights, p. 290.
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not wrong - but incompatible answers to issues o f choice 28 in social
life.29 I have already observed, in section I above, how Dworkin's
attention is diverted from the constituent and legislative moments o f
law's "practice". Similarly, it is diverted from the question o f political
and legal authority's ultimate justification and legitimacy. We come
upon law half-way through the story; the "most abstract and
fundamental point o f legal practice is to guide and constrain the
power o f government in the following way..." (93).30 But w h y
acknowledge the "power" o f "government" at all? For what
should a ruler be exercising his power?
The book does offer a defence o f the legitimacy o f political
authority. But it is very thirr It consists centrally o f the claim that
denying political legitimacy (Dworkin's term for what I would call
justified authority) entails denying, implausibly, the legitimacy o f all
other associative obligations, i.e., the obligations which arise from
family, friendship and other fraternal relationships (see 207). A principal weakness o f this argument, as developed in the book, is that
these other fraternal associations are characteristically founded upon
shared interest in substantive human goods, whereas the political
community, so far as Dworkin invites us to envisage it, eschews any
official concern - certainly any imposition o f obligations on the basis

28 It is hazardous to call such issues "problems", a phrase which seems to
suggest that the major issues of personal or social choice should be understood on the analogy of mathematical or technical problems which commonly do have a uniquely correct or best solution; the tendency to see life
as a series of problems is doing major damage to Western morality and civilization.
29 See Natural Law and Natural Rights, pp. 231-33. O f course, there are other
primary sources of the need for authority: the transaction costs of negotiation and deliberation; selfishness, malice, etc.
3o Sometimes Dworkin speaks as if"iflaw exists it provides a justification for
the use of collective power against individual citizens or groups" (109,
emphasis added) and says that "the ultimate point of law is to license andjusti.~ state coercion..." (127, emphasis added). But the initial statement (at 93) is
truer to his account, which is of law as a constraint upon the exercise of
authority.
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o f such concern - f o r substantive human goods such as health,
knowledge, beauty, the transmission o f human life and culture, and so
forth. In this respect, the book, while it differs from Dworkin's earlier
books by abstaining from explicitly (but cf. 274) describing itself as
"liberal", retains the salient characteristic o f Dworkinian liberalism: it
portrays justified politics, and thus law, as neutral about what is truly
worthwhile and what worthless in human life. 31 It lacks any
articulated concept o f the common good, an ensemble o f conditions
which favour the human flourishing (including rights) o f all members
o f the community, and which ought to be promoted as well as
respected by those in authority, and for the sake o f which others
acknowledge that authority.
The other principal weakness in Dworkin's account o f legitimacy
or authority is that his discussion o f the problem o f securing any
desirable degree o f co-ordination o f human action in community is
buried in his polemic against "conventionalism" (see 144-50). N o w I
have n o brief for (or against) conventionalism, an imaginary
doctrine 32 which Dworkin envisages as the substantive political/jurisprudential counterpart (432) to the semantic theory he calls
"positivism".33 I will, however, observe in passing that his critique o f
31 The unwillingness to speak of goods or harms is remarkably far-reaching.
Thus, in the discussion of negligence, where we would expect a reference to
harms we find only a reference to rights: see 293; cf. 307, 309, where, at last,
the categories "fundamental interests" and "damage - e.g. threats to life" are
acknowledged.
32 Conventionalism, though imaginary, is presented in loaded terms: see 95,
135.
33 Dworkin admits that perhaps no one has ever subscribed to conventionalism precisely as he describes it (94). But I doubt whether anyone
significant subscribes to anything even resembling Dworkin's conventionalism, the key tenet of which is that "the past yields no rights tenable in court,
except as these are made uncontroversial by what everyone knows and
expects" (118). To claim that "if convention is silent there is no law" (118) is
a far cry from asserting that the past has no justificatory "power over the
present" of a kind highly relevant to the judge's proper exercise of his
judicial power and in that sense "tenable in court" - an assertion few indeed
have made, even those who have unwisely spoken of judicial
"discretion" when the law runs out.
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conventionalism (147-50) is very weak. For he simply enrolls "pragmatism" to make the response, and purports to endorse a pragmatist
claim that pragmatism is m o r e "efficient" at coordinating citizens'
actions because "it is so much more adaptive" (149). He himself
will rightly later argue, in effect, that pragmatism is unwarranted in
taking efficiency as the criterion or model o f political justification.
But m y present point is simply this: Dworkin's theory o f law, and
o f law's authority or legitimacy, is weakened by his failure frankly to
acknowledge the case, not m e r e l y for making "past politics decisive o f
present rights" in accordance with an ideal and virtue o f "integrity",
but for creating and applying rules whose legal and moral authority is
directly and simply ascribed to their source, authoritative enactment or
judicial adoption or some other form o f "convention". 34 In attending
to the fact o f consensus - so fundamental to the existence and
worth 35 o f legal systems, and o f a community's judiciary - Dworkin
34 Dworkin's text leaves me in doubt about whether he takes the conventions with which "conventionalism" is concerned to be quasi-constitutional
conventions defining broad institutions such as legislation, Congress,
precedent, etc., or whether he takes them to include also particular institutions and rules established under those constitutional conventions. Much in
the text suggests the former, but other passages are consistent with thelatter,
and at least one seems to require it: "Suppose there is a convention in some
legal community that judges must give both sides an equal opportunity to
state their case" (123).
3s Many will think that Dworkin's emphasis on consistency with the past
(passim), and on demanding that a principle given effect to in one part of law
should "flow throughout the scheme" of the law (436), should have been
balanced by a clear recognition (clearer and earlier than 401) of the worth of
having clear rules (and loyal adherence to them) for securing that litigants
are treated uniformly at a given time, and so do not suffer more than is
inevitable from the excruciating sense that if their case had been tried on
the same day by the judge next door it would probably have been determined differently (e.g. because each judge is attempting the impossible
and all-too creative interpretative task envisaged for him b y Dworkin,
instead of applying the rules). Is it symptomatic that the book contains
some big mistakes in reporting precedents to which it refers, (notably
(2) Attorney-General v. Jonathan Cape Ltd [1976] Q.B. 752; and (185) Roe
v. Wade 410 U.S. 113); and some implausibly dismissive opinions about
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tries to make us choose between basing that consensus on convention
which means treating legal propositions as true 'just because everyo n e else accepts them" (136) - or on "consensus o f independent conviction", "the way we all accept that it is wrong to torture babies or
to convict people we know are innocent" (136). This disjunction
between convention and consensus o f conviction, so defined, is
entirely inadequate to explain and justify legal authority, institutions and obligation. We should refuse to make this choice. But if we
were forced to choose, a sound natural law theory would have no
hesitation in tracing the legal and thus the moral authority o f most o f
the law's rules and institutions (the establishment, though not the
content, o f which is urgently required for the sake o f fairness and the
other components o f the common good) not to consensus o f
independent conviction but to convention. 36
-
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the integrity (as distinct from the justifiability in principle) of certain rules,
such as the one giving immunity in tort to barristers in court (cf. 220, 401),
or forbidding the importation of slaves only after a 20-year run-off period
(184)? The horizon is ordinarily not the best focus for the judicial gaze.
36 See Natural Law and Natural Rights, 281-90; 'The Authority of Law in the
Predicament of Contemporary Social Theory', Notre Dame Journal of Law,
Ethics and Public Policy 1 (1984) 115-37.

